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SENSITIVE
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SUBJECT: SLA/UNITY PLEDGES COOPERATION TO ACHIEVE
CEASEFIRES WITH GOS AND JEM

(SBU) KEY POINTS

-- Special Envoy for Sudan Scott Gration encouraged a delegation of SLA/Unity members in Doha April 28 to help him resolve the big isQ in Sudan by starting first with bringing security and ending human suffering in Darfur.

-- The delegation responded by pledging full cooperation, noting that two cease-fires are needed: one between the Government of Sudan and the rebels and another between JEM and other rebel groups.

-- The delegation said it would take back to its leaders in Sudan early May dates for a return to Qatar for more mediation but thought the dates too early.

(SBU) COMMENTS

-- SLA/Unity's urgent interest in Doha indicates three important new trends: (1) JEM is increasingly hostile to any armed group that does not acquiesce to their leadership and control; (2) SLA/Unity is reaching out to Darfur Peace Agreement signatory, Minni Minawi, and Fur hold-out leader Abdelwahid Nur, in an effort to create a counter to JEM's grab on other armed groups; and (3) SLA/Unity's hurried outreach to the Doha process, AU/UN Chief Mediator, and the U.S. Special Envoy indicates concern that they and others have in the increasingly likely scenario that Darfur could be ruled by JEM (the " Hamas of Darfur " as SLA/Unity called them) and the fear in which the lead up to the rainy season and JEM's final assault on other non-signatories will bring.

End Key Points and Comments.

11. (SBU) In an April 28 meeting with members of SLA/Unity in Doha (Uthman Bushra, Mahjoub Hussein, Sayyed Charif Jar an-Nabi and Fathi Uthman), Special Envoy for Sudan Gration (joined by Ambassador, S/USSES Deputy Tim Shortley and P/E Chief Rice) introduced himself as the U.S. envoy "for all of Sudan and its needs." These include water, sanitation, health care, and food. To this end, the Special Envoy (SE) noted he was working to bring back NGOs following their expulsion by the Government of Sudan (GOS). He said he had succeeded in having the GOS tone down its rhetoric on "spies and thieves" in the ranks of the opposition.

12. (SBU) Nothing, however, noted SE Gration, would be truly fixed before there is security on the ground. Thus, it is imperative to incentivize a cease-fire by providing reconstruction and development that increases progressively the longer the cease-fire lasts. Solving the humanitarian problems while we work on larger issues is also imperative.

Finally, SE Gration encouraged the SLA/Unity to finalize a cease-fire agreement with the GOS and other opposition groups in early May.

13. (SBU) The delegation responded by expressing its desire to cooperate fully and end the fighting and suffering in Sudan. SLA/Unity has conditioned its participation in a cease-fire on the return of the NGOs, so the group was pleased to learn of the progress in that area. "We are suffering and very much want peace" but ask that the NGOs not be from the Arab League, Q the delegation members.

14. (SBU) CEASE-FIRE: SLA/Unity lamented that its membership was "fighting in the north" with Khalil Ibrahim. This was "not good, as we should all be working against the GOS."

15. (SBU) Asked whose participation in a cease-fire would be critical to its success, the interlocutors told SE Gration that SLA/Unity, Khalil Ibrahim's JEM, Abdul Wahid's SLM/AW and their supporters have the weapons and, thus, must be drawn in if the cease-fire will work.

16. (SBU) SE Gration said he was committed to raising money from private donors to incentivize development in areas where armed groups maintain the cease-fire. Groups like SLA/Unity would be able to program reconstruction and development investments in areas under their control within broad categories such as education, health, and agriculture.

17. (SBU) The Special Envoy stressed that a cease-fire needs to be established quickly and collective monitoring measures put in place. SLA/Unity and other groups opposing the GOS need to be part of monitoring the cease-fire. With a

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cease-fire established, said SE Gration, we will be able to lay the groundwork for economic development and the creation of prosperity that is sorely needed in Darfur.

18. (SBU) The SLA/Unity delegation responded by underscoring the need for two separate cease-fires in Darfur. One between the GOS and the rebels, and another between the rebels and JEM. The delegation added that SLA/Unity accepts to work with SE Gration toward a cease-fire and appreciates U.S. willingness to do right by Sudan.

19. (SBU) SE Gration asked SLA/Unity to take action by returning to Doha May 4-5, under an expected Government of Qatar invitation, to move forward on power sharing and the future status of Darfur. The delegation said it would consider this request but thought the May 4-5 deadline too early.

110. (SBU) FUTURE OF SUDAN: SE Gration stressed that he does not want to see Sudan break apart. A cease-fire is sorely needed, as well as steps toward lasting security and viable economic development. While it sounds hard, SE Gration encouraged SLA/Unity and other opposition groups to take the decision to "disarm and then do it fairly." He said he would push this in discussions in Chad and elsewhere in the region.

111. (SBU) UNAMID: Asked what the role of UNAMID should be in Sudan, SLA/Unity members noted that UNAMID soldiers do not protect "our civilians 100 percent," and are not coordinating with us. European soldiers would be preferable. The members added that "forces need to be in areas where there is no government control."

112. (U) SE Gration has cleared this message.

LeBaron